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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans cet article, nous étudions la recherche de statut par les agents économiques dans un 
environnement où un meilleur statut ne procure pas nécessairement un avantage monétaire. 
Pour  cela,  nous  avons  réalisé  une  expérience  en  effort  réel  dans  laquelle  les  agents  sont 
amenés à fournir un niveau d’effort et sont informés de la performance de leurs collègues de 
travail. Nous observons que la plupart des gens ont un goût élevé pour la compétition et la 
recherche de statut au sein de leur groupe. Les individus augmentent leur niveau d’effort dès 
lors qu’ils sont informés de l’effort des autres. Certains sont même disposés à saboter l’effort 
des autres ou à accroitre artificiellement leur propre effort afin d’accroitre artificiellement leur 
statut.   
 




In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no 
monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position.  We use a 
real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their 
relative position in terms of performance.  We find that people express a taste for status.  
People increase their effort when they are informed about their relative performance, and 
some  individuals  pay  to  sabotage  others’  output  or  to  artificially  increase  their  own 
performance although they are paid a flat wage. Introducing the opportunity to sabotage 
others’ output exerts a  negative  effect  on performance. Such effects  can be alleviated by 
inducing group identity that favors positive rivalry but discourages sabotage among peers. 
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While  standard  economic  theory  assumes  that  individuals  only  care  about  their  individual 
payoffs,  there  are  many  situations  in  which  people  exhibit  a  strong  concern  for  social 
comparisons and status.   In economics, social comparisons have been shown to influence both 
behavior (see for example Glaeser et al., 1996, on criminal activity; Duflo and Saez, 2002, on 
investment plans; Güth et al. 2001, Charness and Kuhn, 2007, Gächter and Thöni, 2009, and 
Clark  et  al.,  2010,  on  effort  in  employer-employee  relationships)  and  subjective  well-being 
(Clark  and  Oswald,  1996;  Clark  et  al.,  2008;  Brown  et  al.,  2008;  Ferrer-i-Carbonell,  2005; 
Luttmer, 2005; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010a, b).  Social comparisons are especially important when 
people care about their status in their reference group.  Theoretical models have shown that the 
willingness to pay for status influences efficiency and income redistribution (see for example 
Allgood,  2006,  Hopkins  and  Kornienko,  2009).    A  few  experimental  studies  in  economics 
demonstrate both the importance given by individuals to status and how it affects behavior in 
negotiations  (Ball  and  Eckel,  1996),  markets  (Ball  and  Eckel,  1998;  Ball  et  al.,  2001), 
coordination games (Eckel and Wilson, 2007), and organizations either in cooperative settings 
(Kumru and Vesterlund, 2008; Eckel et al., 2009) or in competitive settings (Huberman et al., 
2004; Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 2008).   
However, none of these studies investigates people‟s investment in status seeking in an 
environment without any expected monetary return from such activity.  Indeed, in most of the 
experimental studies cited above, status is given exogenously and it is provided without any cost 
(with  the  exception  of  Ball  and  Eckel,  1998;  Huberman  et  al.,  2004;  Rustichini  and 
Vostroknutov, 2008).  In this paper, we define status as the individuals‟ relative standing in their 
group and we isolate the pure willingness of individuals to invest in status-seeking activities and   1 
its impact on real effort.  Everyday life provides numerous examples in which people invest 
resources in status seeking to be at the top of the social scale.  Human-resource managers also 
take advantage of this concern for social position through policies such as assigning symbolic 
rewards to the employee of the month.  Status seeking may be related to the desire for dominance 
in competition.  This has been documented both in animals and in humans, as dominance better 
secures  the  access  to  food  or  to  mates.
1  In  the  same  vein,  the  existence  of  competitive 
preferences identified in economics (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink,  Masclet, and van Veelen, 2009) may motivate people to 
engage in such status-seeking activities.
2  However, we would like to be clear that status seeking 
and competitive preferences are not  identical.  Status seeking typically involves some form of 
public  recognition,  while  a  taste  for  competitive  preferences  does  not  depend  on  such 
recognition.    Of course, receiving a symbolic reward may matter even in the absence of 
observability by others if it affects self-esteem.  In this study, however, we are chiefly interested 
in social status and we do not aim at disentangling these two dimensions.    
While one motivation for costly status seeking is the expectation of (eventual) monetary 
benefits, this behavior is also observed when no immediate or delayed monetary  return can be 
derived from the competition.  Indeed, many people engage in behavior such as investing in 
costly status symbols and conspicuous consumption of positional goods (Duesenberry, 1949; 
Veblen, 1949; Frank, 1985), or striving for status and publi c display of status as a goal in itself 
(Huberman et al., 2004).   As shown in Rustichini (2008), humans may be willing to make costly 
                                                 
1 Status seeking may be also related to matching among individuals. For example, if social status signals non-
observable abilities, it may help people to match with people of similar ability, which will be payoff-maximizing in 
case of complementary interactions (Rege, 2008). We do not investigate this dimension in our paper. 
2 In one allocation task in Charness and Grosskopf (2001), a person could choose any amount between 300 and 1200 
for the other person while receiving 600 for herself regardless of her choice.  A number of people choose to allocate 
less than 600.  One example was the individual who chose 599 for the paired participant.   2 
decisions when engaged in a contest if the outcome of the competition says something about the 
underlying factors of the ranking, i.e. if a higher (lower) rank in terms of performance means a 
higher  (lower)  rank  in  the  social  scale.    Individuals  may  therefore  make  costly  choices  to 
improve their status if they believe that others will interpret the outcomes of past contests as a 
signal of their intrinsic value and their status in the society. 
It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  use  field  data  to  determine  the  extent  to  which 
individuals  are  willing  to  invest  in  resources  to  improve  their  status  aside  from  potential 
(eventual) financial remuneration, and how this behavior is affected by the conditions in which 
status can be improved.  Survey data have trouble identifying status-seeking activities and since 
they cannot precisely delineate reference groups, it is difficult to know to whom individuals 
compare  themselves.    By  controlling  the  environment  and  the  composition  of  the  reference 
group,  experimental  methods  offer  the  possibility  of  directly  evaluating  the  individual‟s 
willingness to invest in status seeking. 
  Our aims in this study are three-fold.  First, we study whether individuals care about their 
status in a setting where status derives from receiving more or less salient information about their 
relative position in their group (in the case of more salient information, we assign positive or 
negative  symbols  for  the  highest  or  lowest  rank,  respectively).    Relative  position  is  here 
determined by work performance in a real-effort task.  Status seeking may motivate people to 
perform better (Frank, 1988).  In our environment, people can compete to accumulate positive 
symbols or to avoid negative symbols, but not in order to receive better pay.  Second, we study 
the degree to which individuals are willing to pay to increase their performance in their reference 
group in order to improve their rank and their status.  And third, we analyze how any such 
investment is affected by the feasible mechanism for status improvement.     3 
  Indeed, one can improve one‟s relative position not only by exerting higher effort to 
outperform others (see Azmat and Iriberri, 2010a, and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol, 2009 for field 
data, and Azmat and Iriberri, 2010b and Eriksson et al., 2009, for experimental evidence), but 
also by using other strategies.  Examples of own artificial performance improvement include 
doping  (see  Preston  and  Szymanski,  2003),  forgery,  use  of  ghost-writers  and  plagiarism.  
Competition has been shown to favor unethical behavior (Shleifer, 2004), and Schwieren and 
Weichselbaumer (2010) show experimentally that a competitive environment encourages people 
to  cheat  to  improve  their  own  performance.    Alternatively,  people  may  also  improve  their 
relative position in a group by sabotaging the performance of others.   
In economics, sabotage is usually motivated by the agent‟s willingness to increase the 
probability of receiving the winner‟s prize in tournaments (Lazear, 1989; Chen, 2003; Harbring 
and Irlenbusch, 2008; Harbring et al., 2007); this is also true in our environment, except the prize 
is purely symbolic.  In social psychology, sabotage is more broadly related to the analysis of 
interpersonal destructive deviance at work that causes harm to others (Berry et al., 2007; Tziner 
et  al.,  2006).    Here,  while  sabotage  harms  others  by  destroying  their  output,  it  reduces  the 
earnings of the agent who chooses sabotage (this is in contrast with Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 
2008, in which rank can improve by subtracting money from another player‟s earnings).  To the 
best of our knowledge, we provide the first paper on sabotage and artificial improvement of 
performance in the context of a flat pay scheme.  With our design, we can measure whether 
players  are  more  likely  to  sabotage  others‟  performance  or  to  artificially  improve  their 
performance and their respective consequences on behavior and efficiency.
 
  To preview our results, our data show that even when wages are fixed, many subjects 
exhibit competitive behavior.  Individual performance is significantly influenced by feedback on   4 
one‟s relative position in the group, as people tend to exert significantly more effort when they 
receive information about their rank. A striking result is that some people are willing to pay for 
status  improvement  without  any  instrumental  monetary  considerations,  sacrificing  money  to 
potentially improve their rank. We also find that introducing the opportunity to sabotage others‟ 
output has a negative impact on performance. 
  In addition, there is evidence of bonding: if people from the same school are more likely 
to improve their own relative position artificially, they are less likely to sabotage than when 
matched  with  people  from  other  schools.    This  indicates  that  group  identity  favors  positive 
rivalry  but  discourages  destructive  competition.    Overall,  our  findings  provide  evidence  of 
competitive preferences in non-monetary competitive settings.  Some people value status per se, 
perhaps because they believe that their relative position in a group serves as a signal to others 
about their intrinsic value.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the experimental 
design.  Section 3 presents our behavioral conjectures about the expected treatment effects. The 




Our experiment consists of four different treatments with ten periods each and is based on a 
between-subject  design.    In  our  baseline  treatment,  each  person  is  matched  with  two  other 
people.  We use a stranger matching protocol,  so that groups are randomly reformed at the 
beginning of each new period.  Participants are informed that they will be paid a flat wage of 10   5 
Experimental Currency Units (with 10 ECU equal to one Euro) at the beginning of each of 10 
periods, so that it is common information that wage is uncorrelated to performance.
3  They have 
the option of performing a task during a fixed time of two minutes; this task consists of decoding 
sets of one-digit numbers into letters from a grid of letters that is displayed on the computer 
screen (see the screenshots in the Appendix, where sample instructions are presented). In each 
new period, a different grid of letters and different decoding numbers appear.
4  
  Participants must press a button to start a new period (and immediately receive the wage 
for the period).   Once this is done, they can stop working at any time during the course of the 
period and can resume work at will; they can also choose not to perform the task at all.   We 
provide the participants with alternative leisure activities on the jo b.  Two  magazines are 
provided in each cubicle and t he instructions clearly indicate that people are allowed to read 
these magazines or any personal documents they have brought in their bags.
5  The participants 
are continuously informed of their current number of correct answers.  If a submitted answer is 
not correct, the individual is informed that her response was not correct and the same letter is 
displayed until the correct answer is provided.  Once the two minutes have elapsed, a vertical bar 
is displayed on the screen; its height indicates the total number of correct answers.  In this 
treatment, people receive no feedback about the performances of the other two group members.  
The ranking treatment is identical to the baseline except that the computer displays three 
vertical bars corresponding to the performance of each of the three group members at the end of 
each period on the screens of the group members.  Each person is therefore able to see her 
                                                 
3 This is justified by our willingness to investigate people‟s investment in status seeking in a setting where no 
monetary return can be expected from such activity.  Experiments with flat wage payment schemes include notably 
Falk and Ichino, 2006; Dohmen and Falk, 2010 and Greiner, Ockenfels, and Werner, 2010. 
4 We chose a fastidious and boring task to induce sufficient disutility to the subjects.    6 
relative performance.  In one ranking sub-treatment, people also received positive or negative 
symbols to materialize this ranking.  Specifically, the worker who has performed the best in her 
group receives a “gold medal” while the lowest performer gets a “donkey hat”.  At the beginning 
of each period, each player can see the profile of her two co-workers and this is made common 
information in the instructions.  The profile of each subject includes a historical record of all 
symbols received throughout the previous periods, in order to build a social image based on the 
accumulation of displayable trophies (gold medals) or stigmata (donkey hats).  In order to isolate 
the effects of these devices, we also conducted a variant called the ranking treatment without 
symbols.  This treatment is identical to the ranking sub-treatment described above except that 
highest  and  lowest  relative  positions  are  not  assigned  visual  symbols.    In  the  profile  box 
displayed at the beginning of each period, we indicate for each person the number of times she 
has been ranked first and last in previous periods.   
  The  subjects‟  profile  also  includes  their  gender  and  their  school,  as  in  the  baseline 
treatment.  This also allows us to investigate the importance of in-group effects and whether 
knowing that one shares similar characteristics with the other members of one‟s group influences 
decisions.  Indeed we know the potential importance of group identity and bonding from the 
literature in both social psychology and economics (Tajfel et al., 1971; Brewer, 1999; Akerlof 
and  Kranton  (2000),  Halevy  et  al.,  2007;  Charness  et  al.,  2007;  Chen  and  Li,  2009).    Our 
expectation is that if people are biased in favor of their group, they should sabotage less when 
matched with participants from the same school, same status or same gender. 
  The  redemption  treatment  is  identical  to  the  ranking  treatment,  except  that  the 
participants are informed in the instructions that we add a second stage in which they can modify 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 See Dickinson (1999) for an experimental study of on-the-job leisure.  In the field, leisure at work takes multiple   7 
their  performance.    Indeed  in  this  stage,  people  have  the  opportunity  to  (simultaneously) 
purchase extra units of „output‟ to artificially increase their performance and possibly their rank 
in the performance distribution.  They can buy from 0 to 20 units of output that will be added to 
their original performance; the cost of each unit is 0.5 ECU and this cost is deducted from the 
person‟s payoff.  At the end of this stage, the computer program computes and displays the net 
performance of each group member, and the symbols associated with this net performance (the 
donkey hat for the lowest performer and the medal for the best performer).
  
The sabotage treatment is identical to the redemption treatment except that in the second 
stage participants are informed in the instructions that they can pay to reduce the performance of 
their co-workers.  They can assign from 0 to 20 costly points to each of the other members of 
their group „to reduce their score’.  Each point assigned by player i to player j reduces player j‟s 
performance by one unit of output and this may modify the provisional ranking resulting from 
performing the task in stage one.  Assigning points is equivalent to sabotage (although the term 
is not used in the instructions).  While player j‟s earnings are unaffected by receiving sabotage 
points, a participant who chooses sabotage incurs a direct cost of 0.5 ECU per point of sabotage 
that is subtracted from the flat wage to determine the final earnings for the period.  We chose the 
same cost for each unit purchased in the two treatments.  While each sabotage or redemption 
point costs the same, it should be acknowledged that in some cases, one redemption point allows 
the  subject  to  improve  her  position  relative  to  the  two  other  group  members,  whereas  one 
sabotage point targets only one person.  This brings up the issue of relative cost.
6  Note that our 
                                                                                                                                                             
forms: surfing the net, long coffee breaks, office gossiping, etc. 
6 Some studies have investigated in the context of public-good games the extent to which the decision to punish is 
influenced not only by the cost of punishment but also by its impact on the target.  The evidence is mixed. Anderson 
and Putterman (2006) find that the demand for punishment is decreasing in its price. In Nikiforakis and Normann 
(2008), contributions to the public good increase monotonically in the effectiveness of punishment. In contrast,   8 
results  do  not  seem  to  support  a  cost-efficiency  hypothesis  since  we  should  expect  more 
redemption points than sabotage, which contrasts with what we observe.  
As in the redemption treatment, people can observe any change in the performance of the 
three group members at the end of the second stage.  However, while people can see directly if 
their group members have artificially increased their own score in the redemption treatment, they 
are not informed about who has sabotaged their output.
7 It is also important to note that buying 
points (both redemption and sabotage points) is associated with status seeking as the trophies 
earned will be displayed on the screen of the group members after groups have been re -matched 
in the next periods.  Once a new  group has been formed, everybody is able to observe the 
symbols accumulated by each other group member in the past but no one is informed about how 
these  symbols  have been acquired.  Indeed, as in the ranking treatment, participants in the 
redemption and sabotage treatments are informed that at the beginning of each new period their 
profile will be displayed on the screen of their group members, including the number of donkey 
hats and gold medals earned in the previous periods.
8  
 
2.2. Experimental procedures 
The experiment consists of 24 sessions of ten periods each.  12 sessions were conducted at the 
CREM-CNRS (LABEX) institute of the University of Rennes 1 and 12 others were conducted at 
                                                                                                                                                             
Masclet and Villeval (2008) find that people pay more to increase the harm imposed on targets when punishment 
has a lower impact.  The same result is found in Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) in cooperation games.   
7 We note that the second stage of both the redemption and sabotage treatments involves a strategic decision if 
people care about their status in the group; in this case, if one believes that others will be spending money for 
redemption or sabotage, this may well increase the likelihood that one also spends money on redemption or sabotage 
(in order to at least preserve status).  While we cannot know whether the motivation for engaging in redemption or 
sabotage reflects strategic concerns, in any case the unde rlying motive for purchasing points is that people care 
about status. 
8  Under the assumption that people can perfectly observe each other in peer groups, we deliberately allowed 
individuals to observe any change in the performance of the three group member s.  We would most likely observe 
more sabotage (redemption) with some degree of anonymity, so that our results may represent a lower bound for 
sabotage (redemption) in the laboratory.   9 
the GATE-CNRS institute of the University of Lyon, France.  Between nine and 15 individuals 
took  part  in  each  session,  for  a  total  of  345  participants  who  were  invited  via  the  ORSEE 
software (Greiner, 2004); no individual participated in more than one session.  The participants 
were  undergraduate  students  from  a  variety  of  majors  including  business,  economics,  law, 
engineering, medicine and literature.  Table 1 displays summary information about the sessions 
and includes the session number, the location, the number of people and 3-person groups in the 
session, and the treatment.  
 [Table 1 about here] 
The  experiment  was  computerized  and  the  scripts  were  programmed  using  the  Z-tree 
platform (Fischbacher, 2007).  The experiment lasted on average 90 minutes and each subject 
earned an average of 14.74 Euros, including a show-up fee of 5 Euros. 
3. BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
To  illustrate  what  we  expect  to  happen  in  our  experiment,  we  present  in  this  section  some 
behavioral hypotheses based on individuals‟ concerns for status and social ranking.   
Consider first the baseline treatment.  If one assumes that individuals are only interested 
in maximizing their own payoff, the theoretical prediction is straightforward: the minimum effort 
possible should be exerted in the baseline treatment.
9,10  The same prediction should also apply to 
                                                 
9 Note that the minimum effort provided is not necessarily zero if one assumes that there is some intrinsic motivation 
for working that depends on individual preferences (see Kreps, 1997; Baron, 1988; Dohmen and Falk, 2010; Falk 
and Ichino, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2009). Psychologists and sociologists have long emphasized the importance played 
by intrinsic motivation at work. Intrinsic motivation includes self esteem, interest and pride in one‟s work, and an 
innate sense of duty to “honor one‟s contract” (Kreps, 1997; Baron, 1988; James, 2005; Ellingsen and Johanesson, 
2008) but can also be related to the worker‟s response to extrinsic motivations including fear of discharge.  It should 
be noted that our goal in this experiment is not to identify the determinants of performance in the baseline but to 
investigate the impact of ranking and manipulation of status on work effort. 
10 Several empirical studies  of the gift-exchange game have shown that, despite the absence of any penalty for 
shirking, workers do respond to flat wages by exerting non null effort levels  and that an increase in flat wage raises   10 
the ranking treatment.  Turning next to the redemption and sabotage treatments, we can easily 
see  by  backward  induction  that  the  only  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  of  the  game,  whether 
played once or finitely repeated, is for no participant to either work or purchase redemption or 
sabotage points. 
One  may  however  relax  some  assumptions  and  consider  that  participants  may  be 
motivated by their relative performance, enjoy outperforming others, and desire even the modest 
symbols of status offered in our experiment.  There is strong evidence that people care not only 
about their own payoffs but also about social comparisons and status (Ball and Eckel, 1998; 
Huberman  et  al.,  2004;  Kumru  and  Vesterlund,  2008;  Rustichini,  2008;  Eckel  et  al.,  2009; 
Gächter and Thoeni, 2009; Clark et al., 2010).  These studies have focused on the effects of 
income  comparison  but  very  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  performance  comparison, 
particularly in the absence of career concerns.
 A few studies show that providing feedback on 
others‟ performance induces positive effects on individuals‟ effort under a flat pay scheme.
11  
Both Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009) show that peer effects increase 
productivity when workers can observe another worker‟s output, which supports the idea that 
subjects would incur disutility when they fall behind their fellow workers.  Kuhnen and Tymula 
(2008) also observe that agents work harder when they observe their ranking,  suggesting an 
impact  of  feedback  on  self-esteem  and  a  desire  for  dominance.  Based  on  these  previous 
observations we can write the following hypothesis:  
                                                                                                                                                             
worker‟s effort (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; ). Field experiments have 
confirmed  these  findings  to  some  extent  (see  Gneezy  and  List,  2006;  Kube  et  al.,  2008;  Cohn  et  al.,  2009). 
Interestingly, these findings are robust to the introduction of most unfavorable conditions such as the absence of 
repeated relationships or exogenously fixed wages (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2008; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2010; Greiner et al. 2010). 
11  Similar positive effects of  feedback on relative performance  have been identified under piece rate payment 
schemes and in tournaments (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010a,b; Hannan et al., 2008; see also Eriksson et al., 2009, who 
find more mitigated results).   11 
H1:  In a flat  wage environment,  providing  feedback on others’ performance brings  positive 
effects on performance.  
Our  second  conjecture  is  that,  for  similar  reasons  as  those  presented  above,  some 
participants may be willing to buy sabotage or redemption points although they are costly, in 
order to increase their status.  We are not aware of any study on redemption or sabotage activities 
in  settings  with  a  flat  payment  scheme.    Sabotage  activities  have  been  usually  studied  in 
tournaments  with  monetary  prizes  (Lazear,  1989,  Konrad,  2000;  Chen,  2003;  Garicano  and 
Palacios-Huerta , 2006; Harbring et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008; 
Carpenter et al., 2010). These studies show that if relative comparisons encourage effort, they 
also lead to sabotage.  The rationale of sabotage can be found in the willingness to earn more (as 
its frequency increases in the size and spread of tournament prizes) but also in the desire to win 
per se.  Our conjecture is that if people value their status sufficiently high and if they have 
sufficient competitive preferences and desire for dominance (Rustichini, 2008), they may be 
willing to  exert sabotage at  a cost  under  a flat wage scheme.   Similarly,  we  anticipate that 
individuals may be willing to artificially increase their own performance.  Due to the negative 
externalities  associated  with  sabotage  activities,  we  expect,  however,  to  observe  more 
redemption than sabotage activities.  This conjecture is summarized in H2. 
H2:  Individuals  with  competitive  preferences  will  buy  sabotage  and/or  redemption  points  to 
increase artificially their ranking.  More redemption points should be bought due to the negative 
externalities associated with sabotage. 
Our last conjecture is about the effects of redemption and sabotage points on further 
performance.  We conjecture that the opportunity of sabotage may have strong negative effects 
on performance.  Such destructive effects have been identified in the context of tournaments.  
The efficiency of an organization is reduced for three main reasons:  the most able individuals 
are those who are sabotaged more often (Chen, 2003); sabotage leads workers to provide less   12 
effort  because  they  expect  to  become  the  victims  of  sabotage  (Carpenter  et  al.,  2010);  and 
sabotage may  lead to retaliation, in particular if the saboteur’s identity is revealed (Harbring et 
al., 2007).  In the context of a flat payment scheme, sabotage entails no monetary consequences 
on the victims and could have less negative impact on effort than in tournaments.  However, if 
workers have an intrinsic motivation to exert effort although being paid a flat wage, we suspect 
that  being  sabotaged  will  negatively  affect  the  intrinsic  motivation  of  these  individuals.  
Therefore, we conjecture that the opportunity for sabotage in our environment will induce a 
significant decrease of performance by destroying output and by discouraging high productive 
workers.  In addition, even if workers are re-matched after each period, sabotage may lead to 
blind revenge, as observed in several money burning experiments.  We do not expect such a 
negative impact of redemption activities on average performance, as they do not affect directly 
any co-worker‟s output.  Indirectly they may however reduce the motivating impact of feedback 
on relative performance, as people know that this information can be biased.  This is stated in 
conjecture 3.  
H3: The opportunity for sabotage may have a detrimental impact on initial performance. The 
impact of redemption activities might be also negative, but only indirectly and to a moderate 
degree. 
 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents a comparative analysis of performance across treatments, before analyzing 
the individuals‟ willingness-to-pay for status in the redemption and sabotage treatments.  Last, 
we examine the overall impact of status-seeking activities on individual effort decisions. 
   13 
4.1. Performance  
Table 2 provides some summary statistics on average performance in each treatment and Figure 
1 displays the distribution of effort by treatments. 
(Table 2 and Figure 1 about here) 
Figure 1 summarizes the data on initial performance.  It indicates the  average level and the 
confidence interval of initial (i.e. before sabotage or redemption) performance in each treatment 
across periods.   
Figure 1 shows that on average people score 23.15 correct answers per period under the 
baseline treatment.  Our data also indicate that there is a non-negligible part of subjects who 
choose to perform no task at all. The average frequency of the no-effort choice is 7.77% in the 
baseline.  
Interestingly, both Table 2 and Figure 1 indicate that informing participants about their 
relative performance produces a positive and significant incentive on work effort in the ranking 
treatment.    As  Figure  1  shows,  the  introduction  of  feedback  on  the  performances  of  others 
enhances performance, as the whole distribution shifts up in the ranking treatment compared 
with the baseline treatment.  On average people perform 4.5 units of output more in the ranking 
treatment than in the baseline.  The average performance is 27.65 tasks in the ranking treatment 
(pooling both variants of this treatment since, as we shall see, there is no significant difference 
between them) with less variability.
12  A Mann-Whitney pairwise statistical test using session-
level data indicates that this difference is significant (z = -2.263, p = 0.024). We also observe that 
                                                 
12 A Mann-Whitney pairwise statistical test comparing average performance in the two variants of the ranking 
treatment (with and without the assignment of symbols) indicates no significant difference (z = -1.492, p = 0.136). 
This finding suggests that status symbols per se have little effect on performance compared with simple feedback 
about relative performance. In the remaining of the section we therefore pool data of both ranking treatments.     14 
introducing feedback reduces both the variability in performance and the number of no (or very 
low)-effort  choices,  providing  status-seeking  incentives  for  workers  to  perform  higher  effort 
when information is available.  The average frequency of the no-effort choice in the ranking 
treatment is 2.36%, which is significantly lower that the frequency of no-effort in the baseline (z 
= -2.078, p = 0.037, two-tailed).  These findings are consistent with hypothesis H1.  
Introducing an opportunity to increase artificially one‟s own outcome does not change the 
average initial performance compared with the ranking treatment.  The average score is 25.86 in 
the redemption treatment, which is not significantly different from the ranking treatment (z = -
1.347, p = 0.178).  A weakly-significant difference is however found between the redemption 
and the baseline treatments (z = -1.715; p = 0.08). People actually produce 2.71 units more in the 
redemption treatment than in the baseline (the difference amounts to 3.49 units after the use of 
redemption points).  Finally, allowing people to sabotage decreases initial effort.  On average 
people score 24.19 units of output per period in the sabotage treatment. The difference in the 
actual performance between the baseline and the sabotage treatment is only 1.04 units (with no 
difference at all after the use of sabotage). A Mann-Whitney pairwise statistical test indicates 
that this difference is not significant (z =-0.980, p = 0.327).  The average frequency of the no-
effort choice is 8.20% in the sabotage treatment, which is similar to the baseline (z =-0.245, p > 
0.10).   Finally, a Mann-Whitney test indicates that people actually produce significantly less in 
the sabotage treatment than in the ranking treatment (z=-1.900, p = 0.057) and less than in the 
redemption  treatment  although  not  significant  (z  =0.522,  p=  0.601).    These  findings  are 
consistent with our hypothesis H3.   
Figure 2 shows the time path of average initial performance by period in all treatments.  It 
indicates that the evolution of performance over time differs also across treatments.     15 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 Figure 2 indicates that the average performance is very similar across treatments in the first 
period of the game.  The sharp increase in the average performance between period 1 and period 
2, observed in all treatments, may simply reflect a learning effect.  Figure 2 shows that there is 
little difference in  performance between treatments  in  the first  half of the game.    In sharp 
contrast,  strong  differences  across  treatments  emerge  after  period  5.    These  findings  are 
confirmed by Mann-Whitney tests.
13   After period 5, average performance decreases in both the 
baseline and the sabotage treatments while it remains rather stable over time in the ranking and 
redemption treatments.   
This evolution suggests that status seeking prevents performance from declining over 
time in the ranking and redemption treatments.  The decline of performance in the sabotage 
treatment might be due to the fact that the positive effect of status concern on performance is 
more  than  offset  by  the  discouragement  produced  in  some  players  by  this  destructive 
environment.  This is consistent with our hypothesis H3. 
  Taken together, these findings reveal that  informing participants about their relative 
performance in the ranking treatment induces a positive effect on work effort compared with the 
baseline  treatment.    Introducing  the  opportunity  to  artificially   change  one‟s  own  relative 
performance does not lead to higher work effort in the redemption treatment but it decreases 
performance in the sabotage treatment compared with the ranking treatment.  These findings may 
be explained by a decline of intrinsic motivation for working in such destructive environments.  
                                                 
13 While the difference between the ranking and the baseline treatments in the first five periods is marginally 
significant,  none  of  the  other  differences  are  significant.    In  contrast,  almost  all  differences  are  statistically 
significant in the last five periods.  Compared with the baseline, people work harder both in the ranking (z = -2.546, 
p = 0.011) and in the redemption treatments (z =  -2.091,  p = 0.036), which supports  our conjecture H1.  No 
significant difference is found between the sabotage and the baseline treatments (z = -0.980, p = 0.327).    16 
The econometric analysis reported in Table 3 provides more formal support for these 
results.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  actual  individual  performance.  Since  there  are  10 
observations for each participant, we estimate econometric models with random effects.  Model 
(1) is a Generalized Least Squares model with robust standard errors clustered at the session 
level to control for serial correlation within each session.  The independent variables include 
treatment dummies, with the baseline as the reference category, and a dummy variable equal to 1 
if  the  observation  belongs  to  periods  6  to  10,  and  0  otherwise.    Model  (2)  reports  similar 
estimates with a control for demographic variables (gender, being a student at the University 
versus being in another school, studying economics or not).  To check the robustness of our 
results, we have also estimated two random-effects Tobit models (models (3) and (4)), since a 
number of observations are left-censored (see the distribution of performances by treatment in 
Figure 1. In model (4), we add several interaction variables to the previous independent variables 
to control for trend differences across treatments in the second half of the game.  
 [Table 3 about here] 
Model (1) shows that providing information on one‟s own relative performance has a positive 
and significant effect on absolute performance. All else equal, players‟ effort is predicted to 
increase by 4.51 units (19.71% of the coefficient of the constant term) in the ranking treatment 
compared with the baseline.  The dummy variable “redemption” also captures a positive and 
significant coefficient, indicating that people also provide more effort in this treatment than in 
the baseline.  Performance is 2.71 units higher (11.84% of the coefficient of the constant term) 
than in the baseline.  A t-test indicates that there is no significant difference between the ranking 
and redemption treatments (p = 0.184), suggesting that introducing the opportunity to artificially 
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increase  one‟s  own  performance  does  not  lead  to  an  improvement  in  average  performance.  
Introducing the opportunity to sabotage leaves unchanged the average performance obtained in 
the baseline, suggesting that the positive effects of ranking are offset by the introduction of 
sabotage activities.  Model (2) reports similar results, indicating that these effects are robust to 
the introduction of demographics; similar results are also found with model (3), a Tobit model. 
Model  (4)  indicates  that  the  coefficients  associated  with  the  interaction  variables 
ranking*periods 6-10 and redemption*periods 6-10 are positive and significant at the 1% level.  
These results confirm the fact that status concern mitigates the decline of performance observed 
in  the  baseline  treatment  in  the  second  half  of  the  game.  The  interaction  variable 
sabotage*periods 6-10 is only marginally significant, probably because a large part of the impact 
of status concern is offset by the refusal of some subjects to work in such an environment.  These 
findings support our behavioral predictions. 
2.2. Investment in status-seeking activities 
People  are  willing  to  pay  to  improve  their  performance  artificially  or  for  reducing  the 
performance of others.  On average in a period, the subjects buy 1.08 sabotage points (S.D. = 
2.94) and 0.77 redemption points (S.D. = 2.15).   A Mann-Whitney pairwise test indicates no 
significant difference in the number of points assigned between the sabotage and the redemption 
treatments across all periods (z = 0.733, p = 0.460) or in the final period alone (z = 1.155, p = 
0.248).  The high standard deviation indicates, however, a great deal of heterogeneity among 
individuals.  In fact, only a modest proportion of participants (14.20%) purchase sabotage points 
in a period, but those who do so buy an average of 5.25 points; this represents 26.25% of their 
income for the period.  This amount of sabotage looks relatively low and appears to be rather   18 
realistic, as only few people in the field are expected to exert sabotage activities.  These findings 
are also consistent with previous studies showing that if sabotage happens it generally remains at 
a  moderate  level.    Similarly,  11.90%  of  the  subjects  pay  to  increase  their  performance, 
purchasing 4.58 points on average (22.90% of their income for the period).   
To  better  understand  the  willingness-to-pay  for  status,  we  examine  successively  the 
determinants of sabotage and redemption behavior. 
Status seeking and sabotage 
Table 4 provides information on the determinants of sabotage points by reporting the estimates 
from random-effects Tobit models.  The dependent variable is the total number of sabotage 
points assigned by player i to player j.  The independent variables include the subject‟s actual 
performance that corresponds to the score of player i in the first stage of the game.  It also 
includes the squared value of the actual performance to test for potential non-linearity in the 
relationship  between  sabotage  and  performance.    We  add  several  variables  capturing  the 
subject‟s position in the performance distribution, and include a dummy variable for periods 6 to 
10.
14  We also control for demographics variables and the characteristics of the two co -workers 
to identify the presence of in-group effects.
15 
                                                 
14 The ranki variable corresponds to the relative position of subject i in the performance distribution at the end of the 
first stage of each period; it is equal to 1 for the highest position, 2 for the intermediate position, and 3 for the lowest 
position  in  the  distribution.    The  rank
x
i  variable  is  equal  to  1  if  the  individual  is  in  relative  position  x  in  the 
distribution, and 0 otherwise (with x = 1, 2 or 3 for the highest, intermediate and lowest position, respectively). The 
interaction variable ranki
2*rankj
1 captures the situation where i occupies the intermediate position while the j has the 
highest rank.  The difference in performance between i and j is also included.  Equal performance is equal to 1 if the 
performance of both subjects is equal, and 0 otherwise.  The negative difference variable corresponds to the absolute 
value of the difference between the performance of i and j if i‟s initial performance is lower than j‟s performance, 
and 0 otherwise.  The interaction variable low negative difference takes the absolute value of the difference between 
i and j when this difference is less than 5 units.   
15 We also controlled for demographics variables and for the character istics of the two other co -workers.  More 
precisely, same school is equal to 1 if group members belong to the same school or university, and 0 otherwise.  Same 
gender takes the value 1 if all group members are either males or females, and 0 otherwise.  Last, average medals-i 
(average hats-I) indicates the current average number of gold medals (donkey hats) received by the two other group   19 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 illustrates the relationship between own performance and the decision to sabotage others.  
The initial performance variable captures a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that 
the harder one works, the more one sabotages.  This indicates that the subjects who sabotage are 
also those who are competitive and care about their rank.  However, this relationship between 
performance and the decision to sabotage is non-linear.  The reason is that the agents who exert a 
high performance need less sabotage to improve their rank.  This is confirmed by the positive 
coefficient  associated  with  the  rank  of  the  subject.    After  controlling  for  performance,  this 
positive effect of rank indicates that the subjects who are not the best performers at the end of the 
first stage are more likely to pay to sabotage.  Similarly model (2) in Table 4 indicates that being 
in the intermediate position (rank
2
i) or in the lowest position (rank
3
i) induces people to assign 
significantly more sabotage points than if they have attained the highest performance in their 
group.  No significant difference is found between these two coefficients (p = 0.523).  Including 
demographic variables leave these results unchanged (see model (3)).  
  Do people sabotage to reach the highest position or to avoid getting the lowest one?  The 
rank
2




j is included, 
while the coefficient of this interaction variable is positive and significant.  This suggests that 
those who are in the intermediate position assign points only to those who are in the highest 
position in order to replace them in the highest position.  Additionally, we find a positive and 




j” in estimate (4).  Controlling for this 
variable, rank
3
i is no longer significant, suggesting that those who are in the lowest position only 
assign points to those who are in intermediate position in order to avoid keeping the lowest 
                                                                                                                                                             
members in the previous periods.  This variable is included to test whether being in a group of winners or losers   20 
position.  Results from model (5) also support these findings.  People assign more sabotage 
points when a co-worker‟s performance is equal or slightly higher.   
  Belonging to the same school as the other group members reduces the willingness to 
sabotage.  A possible interpretation is that people are reluctant to sabotage their peers because of 
in-group  preferences.    However,  belonging  to  the  same  gender  does  not  generate  the  same 
behavior,  suggesting  that  being  of  the  same  gender  confers  only  a  weaker  sense  of  group 
identity.    Average  cum  hat-i  has  a  significant  and  negative  coefficient,  indicating  that  the 
presence  of  low-status  co-workers  reduces  the  subjects‟  willingness  to  pay  for  sabotage, 
probably because it is easier to outperform them naturally.  Finally, having received sabotage 
points in previous period has no significant impact, indicating that sabotage is not motivated by 
revenge (which is not surprising since groups are re-matched after each period).   
To summarize, these findings indicate that subjects who pay to sabotage co-workers are 
also those who work hard and are highly competitive.  However, this relationship is non-linear 
since the agents with the highest performance need not sabotage to improve their rank.  Another 
interesting finding is that agents sabotage only those whose performance is close to theirs while 
they tend to give up when the difference in performance relative to the co-worker is too large.  
Finally, our data suggests the presence of an in-group bias, as belonging to the same school 
reduces the subjects‟ willingness to sabotage.  
 
Status seeking and redemption 
Table  5  reports  the  results  from  random-effect  Tobit  regressions  on  the  determinants  of 
redemption decisions.  The dependent variable is the total number of redemption points subject i 
                                                                                                                                                             
influences the decision to sabotage others.   21 
buys to artificially increase her performance.  The independent variables include most of the 
variables presented in Table 4.  The negative difference variable is the absolute value of the 
difference in performance between person i and the person with the next-higher performance, 
and  is  0  otherwise.    The  equal  performance  variable  is  equal  to  1  if  subject  i‟s  actual 
performance is identical to the actual performance of at least one other group member.  It is 
intended to capture the effect of the willingness to differentiate oneself from equals. 
  Table 5 reports very similar results to those obtained in Table 4.  The higher is the actual 
performance,  the  higher  is  the  willingness-to-pay  for  redemption  points.    We  also  find  an 
inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between  actual  performance  and  the  number  of  purchased 
redemption  points.    The  rank
2
i  and  rank
3
i  variables  have  significant  positive  coefficients, 
indicating that people buy more redemption points when they occupy the intermediate or the 
lowest  position  in  the  performance  distribution  compared  with  the  people  who  occupy  the 
highest  position.    Column  (4)  of  Table  5  also  shows  that  people  buy  redemption  points  to 
differentiate themselves from others, when they have equal actual performance; the time trend is 
negative.    Last,  belonging  to  the  same  school  has  a  positive  and  significant  impact  on  the 
willingness of people to increase their performance artificially.  As we observed the opposite 
regarding the willingness to sabotage others, one interpretation is that in a group of peers people 
are  particularly  competitive,  provided  that  being  so  does  not  harm  others,  in  the  sense  of 
„destroying‟ their production.  
 
4.3. The impact of status seeking on effort 
The rank in the distribution of performance and status-seeking activities in the group in the 
previous period may be important determinants of subsequent performance.  We did not include   22 
these  variables  in  the  regressions  reported  above  to  avoid  any  endogeneity  bias.    We  now 
estimate the determinants of changes in individual performance between period t and period t+1 
in separate random-effects Generalized Least Squares regressions.  The independent variables 
include  the  same  controls  for  the  individual‟s  rank  in  the  distribution  as  in  the  regressions 
reported above.  In addition, we include several variables to test for the influence of changes in 
the  relative  position  of  a  subject  in  the  distribution  of  performance  due  to  status-seeking 
activities in the previous period.  In particular, rank
3
i in (t-1)*change is equal to 1 if the subject 
has ended up in the lowest rank in period t-1 while she had a higher rank at the end of the first 
stage of the previous period, and 0 otherwise.  We also include the number of sabotage points 
received by the subject in the previous period and the number of redemption points purchased by 
the subject in t-1.  In addition, we control for the standard demographic variables.  Table 6 
reports the results of these regressions. 
 [Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 indicates that having the lowest rank in the distribution in period t-1 leads people to 
increase their effort in the next period.  This is interesting since effort is increased without any 
additional monetary incentive, which suggests that performance comparisons support intrinsic 
motivation.  In contrast, consistent with previous findings, being a victim of sabotage has a 
significant negative impact on future effort.  Finally, Table 6 indicates that those who sabotage 
and those who purchase redemption points tend to exert more effort in subsequent periods.  This 
suggests that competitive preferences motivate the people who are willing to reach the highest 
rank in their group both to exert productive effort even when paid a flat wage and to use artificial 
and costly means to improve their relative position in their group even when unfair to others.     23 
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are many examples in everyday life at work in which people invest resources in wasteful 
activities  to  improve  their  own  relative  position  in  their  reference  group  or  to  decrease  the 
relative position of others.  This may lead to interpersonal or organizational deviance and to 
illegal or unethical practices like plagiarism, forgery, and sabotage.  Our experiment investigates 
the existence of such behavior  in a setting where we pay subjects a flat wage to perform a 
repetitive task, and provide them with alternative leisure activities.   
Interestingly, our data reveal that individuals work harder when they receive a feedback 
on their relative position in their group. This provides evidence that people care about their 
relative position, and that social comparisons increase motivation for work.   
 
  
Another striking result of our experimental study is that some people are willing to incur 
a cost to artificially increase their relative position in their group without any expectation of 
monetary return of any sort, either by sabotaging the work of others or by increasing their own 
output artificially. In both redemption and sabotage treatments, individuals buy points when their 
performance is close to that of others, either to reach the highest rank or to avoid the lowest one.  
The  sabotage  treatment  provides  clear  evidence  that  some  people  are  willing  to  engage  in 
wasteful status-seeking activities.  
Overall,  we  find  support  for  our  behavioral  theoretical  predictions,  as  there  is 
significantly higher performance in the ranking treatment than in the baseline treatment, and 
significantly higher performance in the ranking than in the sabotage treatment.  Introducing the   24 
opportunity to increase artificially one‟s own relative performance in the redemption treatment 
does not lead to an improvement in average performance.  
  We also find some evidence of an in-group bias and bonding.  Indeed, when people are 
matched  with  peers  from  the  same  school,  they  are  more  likely  to  increase  their  own 
performance artificially by buying redemption points, but they are less likely to sabotage their 
group members.  Group identity seems to favor positive rivalry but it discourages destructive 
competition among peers. 
  Our interpretation is that competitive preferences and a desire for dominance (Rustichini, 
2008) help to explain why people care so much about their relative position that they are willing 
to pay to improve it.  Our intuition is that paying people a flat wage leads those individuals who 
have  competitive  preferences  to  express  them  through  status-seeking  activities,  including 
sabotaging the work of others.   
An objection to these interpretations of the data could be that effort choices simply derive 
from  the  fact  that  participants  feel  committed  to  perform  the  task  in  order  to  please  the 
experimenter  perceived  as  an  „authority‟  (see  Zizzo,  2010  for  an  analysis  of  experimenter 
demand effects).    Although  we  acknowledge that  such  effects  may  exist, we think that this 
interpretation is unlikely to account for our results for several reasons.  First, we were careful to 
avoid having our own students in the experiment, to use no frame in the instructions, and to 
minimize the interactions between the subjects and the experimenter.
16   Second, even if some 
form of authority relationship between the participants and the experimenter did still exist, this 
would mirror the field setting where such a vertical relationship exists, enhancing the external 
                                                 
16 A debriefing written questionnaire asking subjects to describe their choice and strategy did not show any evidence 
for such an experimenter demand effect. 
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validity of our experiment.  Finally, a demand effect cannot explain the differences observed 
across treatments.  Recall that our main aim was not to identify the determinants of performance 
in the baseline treatment but to investigate the effects of feedback on relative performance. As 
such, we believe that our interpretations are the most consistent with all of our findings. 
A natural extension is to investigate whether using a competitive payment scheme would 
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groups  Treatment  Location 
1  15  5  Baseline    Rennes 
2  15  5  Baseline    Rennes 
3  15  5  Baseline  Lyon 
4  9  3  Baseline  Lyon 
5  15  5   Ranking     Rennes 
6  15  5   Ranking      Rennes 
7  15  5   Ranking  Lyon 
8  15  5  Ranking  Lyon 
9  12  4  Sabotage  Rennes 
10  15  5  Sabotage  Rennes 
11  15  5  Sabotage  Rennes 
12  15  5  Sabotage  Lyon 
13  15  5  Sabotage  Lyon 
14  15  5  Redemption  Rennes 
15  15  5  Redemption  Lyon 
16  15  5  Redemption  Lyon 
17  15  5  Redemption  Lyon 
18  15  5  Redemption  Lyon 
19  15  5  Ranking
≠  Rennes 
20  15  5  Ranking
≠  Rennes 
21  15  5  Ranking
≠  Rennes 
22  15  5  Ranking
≠  Rennes 
23  12  4  Ranking
≠  Lyon 
24  12  4  Ranking
≠  Lyon   31 
Table 2. Average performance by session in each treatment 
 

































































































            
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
≠ : Variant of the ranking treatment with symbols 
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                Table 3. Determinants of effort 
 
Dependent variable  Initial perf.  Initial perf.  Initial perf.  Initial perf. 
Models  RE GLS
a  RE GLS
a  RE Tobit
b  RE Tobit
b 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Baseline  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Ranking  4.512***  4.528***  4.780***  3.310** 
  (0.924)
   (1.0280)  (1.467)  (1.495) 
Sabotage  1.038  1.144  1.116  0.5288 
  (1.560)  (1.298)  (1.663)  (1.694) 
Redemption  2.711**  2.923**  3.012*  1.460 
  (1.192)  (1.143)  (1.652)  (1.683) 
Ranking* periods 6-10      2.960*** 
        (0.578) 
Sabotage* periods 6-10      1.188* 
        (0. 654) 
Redemption* periods 6-10      3.126*** 
        (0. 647) 
Periods 6-10  0.558  0. 558  0.459**  -1.711*** 
  (0.431)  (0. 431)  (0.240)  (0.495) 
Demographics  no  yes  yes  yes 
         
Constant  22.878***  21.693***  21.420***  22.496*** 
   (0.535)  (0.872)  (1.545)  (1.562) 
Observations  3450  3450  3450  3450 
Left-censored obs.  -  -  178  178 
Log likelihood  -  -  -11034.217  -11015.973 
Wald 
2  4588.26  8293.61  26.51  63.24 
p > 




 a = Random Effects Generalized Least Squares; RE Tobit
b = Random Effects Tobit. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Since observations within a 
session may be dependent, estimates are conducted with robust standard errors clustered on sessions.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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               Table 4. Determinants of sabotage (random-effects Tobit models) 
 
 Dependent variable  Total number of points assigned by subject i to subject j 
Models  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Actual performance             0.684***  0.630***  0.588***  0.573***  0.544** 
            (0.201)  (0.199)  (0.199)  (0.206)  (0.230) 
Actual perf. Squared            -0.009**  -0.008**  -0.007*  -0.006*  -0.007 
            (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ranki             1.573***         
             (0.510)         
Ranki
1              Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Ranki
2    2.483***  2.504***  -0.076  0.334 
    (0.746)  (0.744)  (0.913)  (0.928) 
Ranki
3  2.971***  2.877***  0.636  -0.451 
  (1.028)  (1.026)  (1.203)  (1.412) 
Ranki
2* Rankj
1      4.037***   
      (0.821)   
Ranki
3* Rankj
2        3.145***   
      (1.143)   
Points of sabotage 
received in (t-1)   
 
    0.160 
          (0.102) 
Positive difference        Ref. 
Equal performance        6.403*** 
        (1.278) 
Negative difference        -0.034 
          (0.100) 
Low Negative difference        1.147*** 
Periods 6-10 
 



























Average medals-i        0.068  -0.232 
        (1.997)  (2.541) 
Average hats-i        -5.833***  -7.141** 
        (1.974)  (2.544) 
Demographics  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  -16.467***  -20.755***  -22.137***  -21.205***  -21.898*** 








































Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.    34 
Table 5. Determinants of the purchase of redemption points 
(random-effects Tobit models) 
 
 








































Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Dependent Variable: Number of redemption points purchased by i  
 Models  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Actual performance  0.826***  0.797***  0.740**  0.588* 
  (0.303)  (0.304)  (0.309)  (0.345) 
Actual performance  -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.017**  -0.015** 
Squared  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Ranki  1.917**       
  (0.768)       
Ranki
1  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Ranki
2    2.442**  2.058*  1.456 
    (1.137)  (1.149)  (1.345) 
Ranki
3    3.750**  2.892*  2.928* 
    (1.543)  (1.611)  (1.627) 
Positive difference        Ref. 
         
Equal performance 
 
    2.469* 
      (1.468) 
Negative difference        -0.138 
      (0.167) 
Periods 6-10  -3.044***  -3.053***  -2.654***  -2.606*** 
  (0.946)  (0.944)  (0.964)  (0.970) 
Same school  
   





   





   





   




Demographics  no  no  yes  Yes 
Constant  -13.927***  -19.494***  -21.592***  -18.893** 
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Table 6. First differences in work effort by treatment (Random-Effects GLS models) 
 
 
Treatments  Ranking  Sabotage  Redemption  Ranking  Sabotage  Redemption 
 Models  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ranki
 in (t-1)  1.047***  1.137***  1.447***       
  (0. 134)  (0.251)  (0.339)       
Ranki
1 in (t-1)        Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Ranki
2 in (t-1)        471  0.579  1.731*** 
        (0.354)  (0.590)  (0.576) 
Ranki
3 in (t-1)        1.157***  1.951***  3.195*** 
        (0. 247)  (0.565)  (0.591) 
Ranki
3 in (t-1)*        3.283  -2.292*** 
Change        (2.883)  (0.486) 
Points of sabotage   -0.239 **      -0.321 **   
received in (t-1)  (0.105)      (0.142)   
Points of sabotage   0.137***      0.140***   
assigned in (t-1)  (0.032)      (0.024)   
Points of redemption   0.304***      0.309*** 
purchased  in (t-1)  (0.071)      (0.079) 
Constant  -1.611***  -1.837***  -2.518***  268*  -0.474  -1.182** 
   (0. 250)  (0.511)  (0.723)  (0.162)  (0.380)  (0.514) 
Observations  1296  648  675  1296  648  675 
Wald 
2  71.00  371.08  53.22  199.85    177.16 
p > 
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level.  
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Fig.2. Evolution of the average performance over time by treatment   37 
 
APPENDIX : Instructions 
 
Instructions for the sabotage treatment 
The instructions for the other treatments are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
We thank you for participating in this experiment in economics during which you can earn money. You will receive 
a show-up fee of 5 Euros. In addition, you will receive additional earnings to perform a task. These earnings are 
given in ECU (experimental currency units). The conversion rate is: 
10 ECU = 1 Euro 
At the end of the session, your earnings in ECU will be added, converted into Euros and added to your show-up fee. 
The total amount of your payoff will be paid to you in private. 
 
This session consists of 10 rounds that will start as soon as you have answered to some preliminary questions on 
your  gender and  your school.  The successive parts start automatically.  At the beginning of each part, all the 
participants are randomly matched in groups of three. Groups are rematched automatically at each new part. The 
identity of these co-participants will remain unknown. 
Description of each part 
At  the  beginning  of  each  part,  you  receive  10  ECU  to  perform  a  task.  This  payoff  is  independent  of  your 
performance at the task. 
Each part consists of two stages: in the first stage, you perform a task, then you are informed on your score and the 
scores of your two other group members; in the second stage, you can modify the score of your group members. 
Description of the first stage 
The task 
The task consists of converting letters into numbers during two minutes. Your screen displays a table with two 
columns.  The first column indicates letters and the second column indicates their correspondence in numbers.  You 
are given a letter and you must enter the corresponding number in the box on your screen. You must validate your 
answer by pressing the „OK‟ button. 
Once you have validated your answer, you are immediately informed whether your answer is correct or not. If your 
answer is incorrect, you must enter a new number until the answer is correct. A new letter appears only after you 
have submitted a correct answer for the current letter. 
As soon you have validated a correct answer, the conversion table of letters and numbers is modified and a new 
letter to convert is displayed on your screen. You can convert as many letters as you like during the two-minute 
period of time.  
Information on your screen at the beginning of a part  
At the very beginning of the first part, a table indicates for each group member his attributes in terms of gender and 
school. 
During each part, you are continuously informed of the remaining time until the end of the part (at the top right of 
the screenshot: „remaining time‟) and of your score (the number of correct answers). 
Please find below a copy of the screenshot that will be displayed.   38 
 
 
Information on your screen at the end of the first stage  
After the two minutes have elapsed, a graph represents your score and the scores of your two group members as bars 
which height is proportional to the number of correct answers provided. 
Description of the second stage 
During the second stage, you can modify the score of each of the other group members. You can reduce the score of 
each of your group members in the limit of 20 units each. You cannot increase their score. 
To modify the score of another member, you can use a slider as indicated on the figure below.  By moving this 
scrollbar, you decide on the number of points that will reduce the scores of the other group members. Each point 
reduces the score by one unit.  While moving the slider, you can see on the figure the score of the group member and 
the height of his bar decreasing. Since there are two other members in your group, you have two sliders. 
Next, you must validate your choice by pressing the „validate‟ button. If you modify the score of another group 
member, it costs you 0.5 ECU for each unit reduced. 
Similarly, your group members can modify your score by during the second stage. You ignore who has modified 
your score, if any. 
Please find below a copy of the screenshot that will be displayed.  
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At the end of the second stage, a new graph indicates your final score and the final score of your two group members 
for this part. 
If you have performed the highest score in your group at the end of the second stage, you receive a „gold medal‟ on 
your computer screen. If you have performed the lowest score in your group at the end of the second stage, you 
receive a „donkey hat‟ on your computer screen. If you perform the intermediate score, you receive neither gold 
medal nor donkey hat. If two group members perform the same score and this score is higher than that of the third 
member, the first two members do not receive any medal and the third member receives the donkey hat. If their 
score is lower than that of the third member, the latter receives the gold medal and the two other members do not 
receive anything.  
These gold medals and donkey hats are cumulated across parts. 
Beware: the assignment of gold medals and/or donkey hats depends on the final score, i.e. after a possible 
change of the initial score by the group members. 
At the beginning of each  new part, the groups of three  members are rematched randomly. Therefore,  you are 
matched with two other participants than in the previous part.  You are informed at the beginning of each new part 
of the attributes of the two other group members. These attributes include for each group member his gender, his 
school, and from the  second part on, the number of  his  gold  medals and donkey hats accumulated during the 
previous parts. 
*** 
During the experiment, you are allowed to read a book or a magazine that you have brought with you or the 
magazine that is placed on your desk.  You must remain seated and keep silent until the end of the session.  You 
must also press the “Next” button at the beginning of each new part to receive the 10 ECU for this part.  
It is forbidden to communicate with the other participants; otherwise, you will be excluded from the session. 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. We will answer to your questions in 
private.   